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End class wars 
Mike Savage calls for sociologists to resolve their differences over definitions 
of social class to allow better analyses of inequality 
 
In the past decade economic divisions have become so stark across the globe that the research 
agenda is being transformed to come to terms with them. The economist Thomas Piketty’s (2014) 
Capital in the 21st Century has had a profound influence – with over a million and a half sales it easily 
the most successful social science research monograph of all time. Like several others Piketty 
charted rising levels of income inequality in the past thirty years, especially towards top earning 
managers and professions. His main contribution was to show how in many rich nations, the balance 
of accumulated wealth – in assets such as property, savings, and goods – compared to the national 
income, has risen dramatically and are returning to disparities last seen over 100 years ago in the 
Victorian age.  
These economic shifts pose challenges for understanding how social classes more broadly are 
changing. Piketty argues we are seeing the revival of a ‘patrimonial class’ – families living off 
inherited and accumulated wealth. Another economist, Branko Milanovic (2016) has claimed we are 
seeing the rise of a global plutocracy, the decline of the middle classes in the developed nations such 
as the USA and Europe, and the growing global middle classes, especially in Asia.  
These shifts are causing intense public interest. In our work with the BBC on the Great British Class 
Survey (Savage et al 2013) we controversially defined seven ‘new’ classes, ranging from an ‘elite’ at 
the top to a ‘precariat’ at the bottom with five more fragmented classes between these. A staggering 
nine million people clicked on the BBC’s online ‘class calculator’ to find out which of these new 
classes they might be in.  
The shifts, and especially the polarisation with wealthy elites pulling away from the majority of 
middle and low income earners, now seem to be shaping world events in powerful ways. Across 
developed nations there is strong anti-elite political feeling, for instance marked in the American 
presidential race by both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump positioning themselves as Washington 
‘outsiders’. In England and Wales, the voting geography of the Brexit referendum tells its own story. 
Areas with high proportions of wealthy and well-educated senior professionals and managers voted 
disproportionately to remain in the European Union.  Meanwhile the economically disadvantaged 
and insecure, more likely to be located in older industrial areas outside South East England tipped 
the balance in favour of leaving the EU.  
These developments demand that we have a better understanding of how social class operates 
today, how it links to these intensifying economic inequalities, and how it relates to other 
inequalities such as gender, race and ethnicity. This is why many universities and funders are now 
investing in large research centres to address these concerns. For instance, the LSE’s International 
Inequalities Institute, which I co-direct, recently received £65 million, the largest grant in the history 
of the LSE from Atlantic Philanthropies to train leaders to combat inequality. We are working with 
partners in the global south to develop this Atlantic Fellows programme, notably University of 
Capetown’s Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice and the Centre for the Study of 
Conflict and Social Cohesion in Chile. Elsewhere, Harvard has a multi-disciplinary program on 
Inequality and Social Policy; Stanford a Center on Poverty and Inequality, UCLA has Luskin’s Institute 
for Inequality and Democracy and Cornell has a Center for Inequality   (also in receipt of Atlantic 
money). Other notable investments include the OECD’s Centre for Opportunity and Equality.  
However, if we are to make progress, we need to resolve the current entrenched differences 
amongst sociologists about how social class should be conceptualised and measured. Understanding 
the nature of this current dispute requires me to reach back in history.  
DEFINING CLASS 
The study of social class goes back to the 19th century industrial revolution. When the -- - largely 
British  -- scholars of the 19th century launched modern investigations into poverty and inequality 
during the early years of industrial capitalism, their understanding of social class had strong ‘moral’ 
overtones. They assumed that professionals and gentlemen were more respectable and worthy than 
the poorer classes, who were therefore responsible for their own misfortunes.  
Accordingly, in the first major study of poverty, on 1880s London, the Liverpool shipowner Charles 
Booth defined the poorest streets of London as “vicious and semi-criminal”. He categorised people 
into seven classes according to where they lived, based on households’ economic position, as judged 
by school officers, policemen, and the like. Not surprisingly, moral judgements also abounded. Booth 
defined the poorest classes as having ‘the life of savages, with vicissitudes of extreme hardship and 
their only luxury is drink’; whereas he saw the lower middle as a ‘hardworking sober, energetic 
class’. Similarly, the upper middles were defined as a ‘servant keeping class’ — all part of a culture 
where ‘keeping up appearances’ was the essence of class itself. 
Over the course of the 20th century the social sciences made a sustained attempt to strip out these 
moral dimensions – though of course as Imogen Tyler (2015) has recently insisted, these stigmatising 
and moralising dimensions remain very powerful today – as indicated by narratives around ‘benefit 
scroungers’, ‘immigrants’ and other ‘undeserving’ groups. From the mid twentieth century 
sociologists sought to provide a more objective, exact and precise definition of class — one which 
could be accurately measured regardless of one’s political perspective. From the 1940s to the 1960s, 
predominantly American researchers developed scales of ‘socio-economic status’ which typically 
combined measures of income, education and occupational prestige. Duncan’s Socio-Economic 
Index of 1960, for example, used measures of the proportion of people thinking that particular jobs 
had "good" or "excellent" prestige and linked these to the percentages of men in the occupation 
who completed high school or more and who reported at least $3,500 in 1949 income. 
British researchers from the same period, by contrast, elaborated a perspective which has become 
very powerful across the globe. They argued that social class should be assessed in a just one way: 
according to a person’s occupation. This approach dated back to 1913, and placed people in one of 
six classes according to the ‘skill’ of the job. This led to a differentiation between a class of skilled 
non-manual occupations from skilled manual occupations, and placed at its heart a fundamental 
divide between manual and non-manual workers. This was, perhaps, a very ‘British’ way of thinking 
about class.  
WORK LIFE  
In 1980 the British sociologists John Goldthorpe unveiled a more refined version of this occupational 
approach, in his pioneering studies of social mobility in the UK (Goldthorpe et al 1980). He found the 
older model unsatisfactory because the definition of skill was often opaque, and took no account of 
whether people were self-employed or employees, or whether they had supervisory authority. His 
new model came to be enshrined in the UK’s Office of National Statistics by the later 1990s This 
scheme has been elaborated internationally, most notably through the European Socio-Economic 
Classes (Rose and Harrison 2014), and serves as a benchmark across many different nations, 
especially where there are comparable survey questions on employment.   
Its basic features are listed below 
 
Goldthorpe differentiated between a waged working class and a salaried ‘service’ class. Certain 
hybrid groups — the self-employed, or skilled technicians and supervisors — he deemed 
intermediate between these two. Labourers employed on a contract – paid specific, discrete, wages 
for their work — such as bus drivers, coal miners or factory workers. Doctors, lawyers, senior 
managers and academics, by contrast, Goldthorpe classed as having a more diffuse relationship with 
their employer, receiving prospective rewards (such as incremental salaries, pension entitlements 
etc) to acknowledge that the work they do cannot be so easily demarcated and regulated. 
Confusingly, he called this a ‘service’ relationship – but this should not be muddled with actual 
servants, or people working in the ‘services’ (such as retail or the health services), many of whom 
are employed on ‘labour contracts’.  
Goldthorpe’s work was pivotal because of its pioneering use of representative national surveys 
which were becoming much more common from the later 1950s. By construing class as one 
distinctive variable – the nature of one’s job -- it is possible to use it to track social mobility, and to 
measure its influence on characteristics such as health or mortality. It can also, at least on the face of 
it, be differentiated from the effect of other variables such as income, education, race or sex. This 
approach has been shown to be robust (at least in the British case, where it is most widely used) for 
predicting earnings, the provision of fringe benefits such as pension entitlements , risks of 
unemployment and control over work scheduling (see the summary in Williams 2016).  
One of the attractions of this approach is that it has proved highly effective in comparative research. 
Whereas previously nations had their own different ways of classifying occupations into larger social 
groups, it enabled researchers to measure differences in social mobility using formally identical 
criteria across different nations. Thus, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) were able to rebut popular 
views that there is more social mobility in the United States than Europe, and to demonstrate that 
social mobility was often higher in Eastern European nations which had undergone socialist 
transformation. This has been very important work. But in the current climate, its value has been 
called increasingly into question. 
 
BLUNT INSTRUMENT 
For all its elegant clarity, Goldthorpe’s approach has faced mounting criticism in recent years, of four 
kinds. Firstly, because it focuses on the employment relation as the key measure of class, it is less 
useful in those parts of the world – notably in the global south - where people, are less likely to be 
engaged in the formal labour market and are more likely to be in household labour (see e.g. 
Maloutas 2007). Similarly, the very large numbers of people who are retired, disabled or 
unemployed cannot be directly placed within it. Many feminists have objected to the focus on those 
who are in formal paid work – who often tend to be men!  
Secondly, this approach lumps together people in large occupational classes, and does not pick out 
more specific occupational groups. Doctors or lawyers are not treated separately, but as part of a 
bigger ‘higher grade’ professional and managerial class, for instance. This is the reason why 
American sociologists David Grusky and Kim Weeden argue that a ‘micro-class’ methodology which 
distinguishes between different occupations, offers a more granular handle on the generation of 
inequalities. They (Weeden and Grusky 2012) have shown that a version of Goldthorpe’s classes 
predicts much less of Americans’ consumption practices, and political attitudes in the past decade, 
compared to the 1970s, whereas their own micro-class approach fares much better.  
Third, economists have shown that the key dimensions of income and wealth inequality which have 
come to the fore in recent decades do not map strongly onto these big occupational classes. This is 
especially the case in the past thirty years when in many nations the incomes of the top 10%, and 
even more, the top 1% have pulled away from the rest. This means that only a minority of the even 
the high grade professionals and managers have enjoyed the largest increases in their economic 
position. The Goldthorpe class schema seems too blunt an instrument to explicate rising economic 
inequality. (Some economists, including Piketty, prefer to think of classes as broad income groups 
instead.) 
Finally, Goldthorpe’s model of class has not proved effective in explaining key social and political 
outcomes. For instance, political attitudes and actions are only weakly correlated with job type. Until 
the 1980s there was a strong tendency – in Europe and elsewhere - for those in manual occupations 
to support left and socialist movements, while the salaried voted for more conservative or 
established parties. This pattern is now much less clear. Even Goldthorpe concedes that his 
measures of class do not predict consumption patterns such as newspaper readership or leisure 
interests.  
CAPITAL GAINS 
Since the late 1990s an alternative approach to class has become increasingly attractive to 
sociologists across the globe seeking to understand how class and inequality intersect. This ‘capitals, 
assets and resources’ (CARs) perspective is influenced by the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu 
(1985). It defines class as an emergent property of different ‘capitals’ which allow their possessors to 
accumulate resources over time so that their relative advantages over others rise.   
For Bourdieu, there are three capitals: economic, cultural and social. Economic capital refers to 
income and wealth – which is more attuned to the way economists measure inequality than to 
sociologists such as Goldthorpe. Bourdieu also sees cultural activities as a separate form of capital, 
which can be used to generate advantages. He points to how those who in childhood are exposed to 
cultural riches such as attending the theatre or museums, become familiar with abstract ideas and 
perform well in the educational system: they parlay their cultural capital into educational attainment 
which enables them to get better jobs.  Finally, social capital is the phenomenon by which those with 
privileged networks accrue further advantages. In part this is the familiar ‘old school tie’ system of 
swanky internships for gilded youth, but it also captures the way that those with wider social 
networks can gain advantages.  
One advantage of this CARs perspective is that it can readily categorise people who don’t have 
formal jobs, including the retired, (often female) carers, and children. It is able to use survey or other 
data sources to map anyone’s economic, social and cultural capital. It recognises that the nature of 
cultural capital may vary between contexts. A good example is that older people with cultural capital 
tend to have more formal and highbrow activities – going to classical music, theatre, and so on – 
whereas younger people with cultural capital are more attracted to contemporary music, the social 
media, and ‘emerging’ forms of culture (see Prieur and Savage 2013).  
The three capitals have strong synergies. In places where the rich are also culturally engaged in 
similar activities, and well-connected, for instance, then they form a strong and distinctive social 
class. In our book Social class in the 21st century, (savage et al 2015), we have argued that this is 
happening today with the very wealthy British elite, who likely have exclusive social networks and 
enjoy similar cultural pursuits, often from attending to the same kinds of elite universities together. 
London, and other major cities in the world, are becoming key venues for this elite formation. It 
seems that the super-rich discussed by Piketty and other economists are also socially and culturally 
exclusive.  
But there are other classes with discrepant amounts of economic, social and cultural capital. One, 
which we called ‘emerging service workers’ have considerable amounts of social and cultural capital, 
but less money: these tend to be well educated young people who are unable to gain career 
footholds in today’s competitive labour market. Our model of class from the Great British Class 
Survey therefore does not focus on the boundary between middle and working class, because they 
cannot be neatly separated in the way that the older occupational class models claim. Instead, we 
focused on two classes with radically different amounts of capital: the elite who had high amounts of 
all three capitals, and the ‘precariat’ who scored lowest on nearly every category. This is a model 
based only on UK data and would need to be finessed in other nations to take account of their 
unique situation – but its general focus is more attuned to polarisation at the extremes of the class 
system which seems intuitively powerful in many areas of the world.   
This approach might offer an analytical focus for understanding why mobilisation against ‘elites’ is so 
salient in so many places at the moment. It also shows how investing in education, as is happening in 
most nations, does not necessarily reduce class divisions, but accentuates them since those who 
have the most capitals who are best placed to compete effectively to gain access to the most august 
institutions. It is therefore a challenging, even pessimistic view, of current trends. 
POLICY ISSUES 
These differences between these approaches to class are not just academic debates, but affect how 
we address growing inequalities. For the occupational class approach, class divisions are built into 
the structure of employment, and therefore modifying these becomes central to addressing 
equality. Proponents of this approach therefore argue that investing in education by itself will not 
address the underlying class inequalities, and that re-structuring the economy and employment 
relationships has to be central to addressing class inequality 
Those supporting CARs approaches offer a more multi-dimensional perspective. A central policy 
feature is to consider how the accumulation drawn from different capitals might be challenged. 
Piketty’s call for a 1% annual wealth tax is a well-known example. More generally, policies over 
housing wealth, inheritance, generational equity, and citizenship can be seen as ways of creating 
more equitable distributions. These concerns extend to attempting to address cultural and social 
capital, for instance by developing educational policies to support those from disadvantaged 
backgrounds to move to higher education, or to build the social networks of those who are 
marginalised can all be seen to have some potential. 
  
CULTURE CLASH 
Critics of CARs have conceptual and methodological beefs. Defenders of occupational approaches to 
class are critical of conflating class with cultural or social dimensions, and think this leads to 
imprecision. They also argue that occupational class offers a better way of placing people in classes 
than their income, as this can fluctuate quite considerably, and can be difficult to measure (do we 
look at household or individual income? Do we include benefits, pension savings, etc?) People might 
also be less likely to accurately state their income than their occupation, which it follows is the most 
practical and easy way of defining someone’s class.   
Similarly there are differences over whether cultural capital is as important as was claimed by 
Bourdieu. Some feel it is of minor, or secondary importance, arguing that it assumes that intellectual 
and high-brow culture carries more power than it actually does today. The Harvard sociologist 
Michele Lamont (1992) argued that Americans are much less respectful of intellectual and artistic 
values than the French, for instance. It is doubtful too that ‘highbrow’ culture has such importance in 
China, and indeed many nations which have a history of communist and socialist governments. 
Numerous sociologists have examined the rise of what is often called ‘the cultural omnivore’ who 
grazes between Mozart, Big Brother, Bollywood films and the LA Lakers and is much more culturally 
pluralist than is recognised by those arguing for the significance of cultural capital. These are all 
challenging issues which require proponents of the CARs perspective to substantiate their 
arguments about cultural and social capital. 
CLASS WARS  
I have shown how sociologists are at loggerheads over different approaches to defining class. This 
came to a head in the debate about the seven classes we defined using the Great British Class 
Survey, when defenders of the occupational approaches saw our approach of defining classes as 
incoherent data mining, using a flawed data source because the BBC’s web survey was not fully 
representative of the UK population (Mills 2014).    
The reasons for this acrimonious debate are several-fold. To some extent, it is tribal: different 
research communities have their allegiances.  Established sociologists feel that that the late 20th 
century approaches to class have been tested and elaborated over many years. Employment 
categories are particularly beloved of researchers focusing on standard quantitative analysis of 
nationally representative sample surveys, such as Britain’s famous birth cohort studies which are 
envied throughout the world. 
The CARs perspective is popular with younger, more heterodox sociologists, especially those trained 
in qualitative methods (such as ethnography or case studies). There are also different theoretical 
styles: the occupational class school prefers formal model building, whereas the CARs researchers 
are more concerned with describing what they see as going on. It follows that the newer researchers 
are more attracted to using less standard data sets – such as non-representative web surveys.  
Defenders of the CARs approach, see new forms of elitism and snobbery at work, which do much the 
same job as the old. Knowing ‘hip’ brands, avoiding vulgar holiday destinations, and living in trendy 
and fashionable neighbourhoods is very much linked to snobbish concerns.    
BRIDGE THE DIVIDE 
Can these camps be reconciled? In my view, yes. Partly it is a matter of both sides showing modesty, 
appreciating what the other has to offer, and extending olive branches. Above all, both camps are 
concerned with the injustices of class inequality and are concerned to challenge the advantages of 
the rich and powerful. It would be a shame if this shared aim is lost sight of because of internecine 
squabbles.  
In this spirit of reconciliation, it can be noted that the two approaches are actually using the class 
concept in different ways. The occupational approach seeks to define class as a distinct variable, so 
that its distinctive effects can be noted on life chances, mortality, educational attainment and so 
forth. It does this job fairly well. The CARs approach is concerned with class as a historical process – 
identifying the ways that classes form as linked economic, social and cultural groups which can thus 
shape social change in the future, for instance through claiming that powerful elites are a 
fundamentally significant class today.  
It follows that there is plenty of scope for a ‘horses for courses’ approach. One way of making 
progress would be to consider further how occupational classes are associated with cultural, social 
and economic processes. Here, it is possible to take advantage of new forms of data to explore 
congruencies and differences in their perspectives. Nationally representative surveys often do not 
have developed questions on cultural or social capital. And with a sample sizes rarely extending 
beyond 10,000 people there are often limits to examining outliers and ‘micro-classes’.  
There is a growing interest in using tax records to examine economic inequality. Here there is no 
need to sample, and analysis of income and occupation can take place on the entire population. 
Such data has no information on social and cultural capital, but perhaps they could be combined 
with, ‘geodemographic data’, collected by market researchers on local neighbourhoods. This has 
extensive information on consumption and spending. Similarly there is a vast trove of data on 
communication, connections, consumption, health status and so on, held by Google, Facebook, 
Amazon and the like. 
As a first step, developing interdisciplinary work offers very exciting possibilities. Engaging 
economists, anthropologists and political scientists alongside sociologists is the most likely way of 
making petty internal disputes amongst sociologists look parochial. Social scientists have been 
slower than natural scientists in moving away from disciplinary identities towards interdisciplinary 
teams working on common problems. The study of inequality can only be tackled by all social 
scientists working together and pooling their skills. Models such as the LSE’s International 
Inequalities Institute – as well as many others around the world – will play a vital role in allowing 
focused studies and will generate the new scientific analyses of class which are vitally needed to 
unravel the increasingly unequal and riven societies we live in. 
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